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The Concepts of the Scottish (and Italian) Unilateral Promise 
and the English Unilateral Contracts – 
Comparative Law Reflections on “Call Options” and “Put Options” in the light 
of the Jurisdictions of England, Scotland and Italy
PIERDOMENICO DE GIOIA-CARABELLESE
Abstract
On the backdrop of the “put options” and “call options” – two common contracts 
in the practice of the capital markets – lies this comparative law analysis concern-
ing the approach taken by three jurisdictions to the concept of the unilateral prom-
ise.
The outcome of the discussion is a criticism toward the English jurisdiction where 
this concept is missing, the same being replaced, in a non-convincing way, by the 
similar concept of the “unilateral contract”. In addition to this, the requisite of the 
consideration, peculiarly requested in that jurisdiction, could even result in putting at 
risk, in some circumstances, the same validity and enforceability of these typologies 
of transactions. 
As to the Scottish jurisdiction, stranded between its ancient Roman roots and its 
“British ties”, the work seeks to demonstrate that, although the “unilateral promise” 
is accepted in this jurisdiction (these making both “put options” and “call options” 
theoretically safe under this jurisdiction), there is still a non-perspicuous categoriza-
tion of the concept and, particularly, a possible “blunder” in the way this jurisprudence 
seems to put together, in a sort of conceptual “melting pot”, both the promise to the 
public (in incertam personam) and that aimed at the conclusion of the contract. How-
ever, this possible erroneous view – quite transparent in the light of the civilian juris-
diction adopted as comparator (the Italian one) – could ﬁnd a potential “way-out”, 
should the Scots legal system eventually adopt a code in the matter of the contracts 
more in line with its traditions and peculiarities.  
1.     The Economic Rationale of Options in the “M&A” Field*
In the “M&A” business practice,1 an option2 is a right to purchase or to sell prop-
erty at a future time. An M&A Option is contracted either as part of a contract or 
* Lecturer, Heriot-Watt University.
1 M&A market (acronym of Mergers and Acquisitions) comprises transactions whereby the acquisi-
tion of the majority stake of a target company is fulﬁlled. For explanatory purposes, reference must be 
made to take-overs or sale and purchase agreements.
2 Henceforth the “M&A Option”.PIERDOMENICO DE GIOIA-CARABELLESE 382
as a unilateral promise; in either case, in order for the property to be purchased or 
sold, the M&A Option must be exercised. 
The right to sell or purchase, encompassed in an M&A Option, normally but not 
necessarily requires the payment of a premium.3 Thus, a potential buyer of shares is 
required to pay a certain amount of money which gives her a period of time to decide 
if he wishes to conclude the transaction and then pay a further amount for the shares 
themselves.4 If the beneﬁciary decides to exercise the M&A Option, then he pays the 
“Strike Price”. In contrast, if the time to exercise expires then the M&A Option ter-
minates. Remarkably, the Premium is not refundable as the “beneﬁciary” buys the 
M&A Option independently of whether or not he will exercise it. 
M&A Options are also known as “Call Options” or “Put Options” according to 
whether the right which the beneﬁciary is entitled to is a right to purchase shares or, 
conversely, to sell them. 
Traditionally scholars have commented little in respect of M&A Options,5 although 
the peculiarity of their structure and, their non perspicuous categorisation (particularly 
under the English common law) ought to encourage a different conclusion. 
On this backdrop, these notes will analyse M&A Options in a threefold perspec-
tive, with respect to common law (particularly the law of England and Wales), to the 
civilian systems (namely, the Italian one) and to a mixed legal system, such as the 
Scottish one. 
The discussion will be carried out bearing in mind the characterisation, which 
pursuant to each legal system duly considered, may be inferred with respect to the 
M&A Options; in addition to this, suggestions will be made for those legal systems, 
like the English one, in which, due to certain peculiarities6, the enforceability of these 
agreements appears to be somewhat doubtful. 
Moreover, this work aims to demonstrate that legal systems, such as both the Scot-
tish and the Italian one, in which consideration is not required, are more market-
friendly with respect to M&A Options in comparison with others such as the English 
system, in which conversely the feature at stake may be a “sword of Damocles” pend-
ing on the validity and enforceability of simple contracts.   
3 Henceforth the “Premium”.
4 The so called “Strike Price”, usually amounting to a signiﬁcant multiple of what has been paid 
for the “Premium”.
5 In the literature (usually the economic rather than the legal one), the study of such peculiar con-
tracts is usually carried out “tangentially” or simply hinted at; eg DJ Cooke & J Dow, Private Equity: 
Law and Practice (2nd edn, Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell 2004); E Ferran, Principles of Corporate 
Finance Law (Oxford University Press 2008) particularly at 203, 230. In Italy, among the ﬁrst legal anal-
yses, mention can be made to P de Gioia-Carabellese, ‘Revocatoria Fallimentare e Sorte delle Securities 
Option’ [Claw-back Rules and Consequences on Securities Options] (1998) 3 Il Mondo Bancario 71, 75.
6 In particular, consideration as requisite for a contract to be valid and binding.SCOTTISH (AND ITALIAN) UNILATERAL PROMISE [2011] EBLR 383
2. Leg  al Characterisation of M&A Options
From a mere legal perspective, M&A Options are agreements whereby a party 
(promisee) contracts with another (promisor) the right to acquire or to sell, at a 
certain future time, a specific amount of shares. In addition, M&A Options may 
even be structured in the form of unilateral promises; in the latter case, the prom-
isee does not formally contract terms and conditions, rather he is merely the recip-
ient of a unilateral declaration by the other party.
More often than not, the M&A Option is accompanied by a Premium, which is the 
consideration that the beneﬁciary of the promise gives the other party for his right to 
be duly entitled to exercise the M&A Option itself. In actual fact, such a Premium is 
not a necessary element and there are several cases in which it is completely omitted. 
The absence of the Premium in the context of the M&A Option is one of the cru-
cial points in this legal analysis, as it gives ﬂesh to the peculiarities of the English 
system with respect to the two others under consideration. The English legal system, 
in fact, does traditionally recognise consideration as one of the main features for a 
contract to be valid. As a result, an attempt will be made, from a practical perspective, 
with a view to understanding whether even under English law, the validity of an M&A 
Option not duly endowed with a Premium and therefore gratuitous may nonetheless 
be afﬁrmed. 
3. Opt  ion and Promise in the Traditional English Law Perspective
3.1. The Unilateral Contract
At least theoretically, English law recognises, albeit controversially, the unilateral 
contract. These may be defined as agreements whereby 
“One party promises to pay the other a sum of money if the other will do (or 
forbear from doing) something without making any promise to that effect.”7
Under case-law the categorization of unilateral contracts is recent, as English com-
mon law traditionally lacks the concept of unilateral promises. Under case law there 
are two cases to be recalled: Harvela Investments Ltd v. Royal Trust Co of Canada;8 
Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v. Blackpool Borough Council.9 
7 GH Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th edn, Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell 2003) at 8,41. This maxim 
is echoed by E Peel, Treitel The Law of Contract (12th edn, Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell 2007) at 40) 
where it is afﬁrmed that a unilateral contract “arises without the offeree’s having made any counter-
promise to perform the required act or forbearance; it is contrasted with a bilateral contract, in which 
each party undertakes an obligation and in which acceptance, as a general rule, takes the form of a 
communication by the offeree of his counter-promise.”
8 [1986] AC 207.
9 [1990] 1 WLR 1195.PIERDOMENICO DE GIOIA-CARABELLESE 384
In the ﬁrst case, The Royal Trust invited tenders for the sale of a controlling block 
of shares in a company, the offeror being adamant that only the highest offer received 
would have bound itself. The plaintiff submitted an offer of C$2,175,000, whereas 
the second defendant (Sir Leonard) lodged a bid of C$2,100,000 “or C$101,000 in 
excess of any other offer”, “whichever is the higher”. The Royal Trust accepted Sir 
Leonard’s referential bid; in the ensuing case, upon Harvela’s initiative, the Court 
held that the implied intention of the conditions of tender was to exclude referential 
bids and to invite only ﬁxed price bids. As a result the plaintiff’s requests were upheld.
Remarkably, the thrust of the Court decision at stake is not the decisum itself, rather 
the qualiﬁcation which, as per Lord Diplock’s averments, is provided for in respect 
of the unilateral offer to sell the shares at the highest price. In essence, the invitation 
is viewed as a “unilateral” or “if” contract which is made “at the time when the 
invitation was received by the promisee to whom it was addressed by the vendors.”10 
To elaborate, the characterisation as “unilateral contracts” lies on the fact that 
“Under neither of them [i.e. if contracts, not as per original text] did the promisee, 
Harvela and Sir Leonard respectively, assume any legal obligation to anyone to 
do or to refrain from doing anything.” 
The unilateral contract entailed under the “Harvela” case is nothing but the Trust’s 
undertaking to be bound to enter into a “synallagmatic” (exchange) contract with 
the highest bidder.11 Not without emphasis, it is affirmed12 that, under such a prom-
ise, the offeror assumes an obligation to enter into a contract to sell shares to the 
bidder who offers more; in such a way 
“The unilateral contract concluded with the successful bidder would be trans-
formed into a binding bilateral contract, while the unilateral contract with the 
unsuccessful bidder would be terminated by the submission of the higher bid.” 
Albeit with certain similarities, the Blackpool case13 partially differs from the 
Harvela case in so far as, in the latter, the conditions for the contract to be made 
were placed only on one party,14 whereas in the former the benefit merely results 
in being a bid submitted on time. In addition, in the Blackpool case a formal accep-
tance of the “subsidiary contract” was in any case required on the side of the 
10 Because the case being examined dealt with two invitations, accordingly two unilateral contracts 
resulted: that existing between the vendors and Harvela, as previous promisee; the second one, between 
the vendors and Sir Leonard, as second promisee.
11 As emphasised in Chapter 4 below, under Scottish law the same result is reached, albeit via the 
different but more perspicuous, concept of the unilateral promise.
12 See E McKendrick, Contract Law. Text, Cases, and Materials (3rd edn, OUP 2008) at 78.
13 A thorough narration of the dispute may be read in JAK Huntley, J Blackie, C Cathcart, Contract: 
Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Green & Son Ltd 2003) at 82.
14 Namely the party submitting the highest bid.SCOTTISH (AND ITALIAN) UNILATERAL PROMISE [2011] EBLR 385
offeror, as, conversely, under Harvela “the unilateral contract was held to exist by 
mere declaration of one of the parties.”15  
Although according to the Court decisions at issue is the concept of the “unilateral 
contract” which makes its debut on the English law “stage”, and it still remains 
doubtful, not to mention mysterious, if and how a consideration for such a promise 
is given for the promisor’s undertaking.
Moreover, not only is the concept of the “unilateral contract” a recent acquisition 
of English common law, but it also no longer appears monolithic to commentators. 
In fact, a different theory seems to be advocated by those scholars who see in the 
“Harvela” case a mere offer of a unilateral contract, the “prize” being in such a case 
the contract itself for the sale of shares. On such footings, pursuant to such an inter-
pretation
 “Until the bid was made, no one was under obligation. The Trust could have 
withdrawn its offer and the two offerees were under no obligation to bid. [..]” 
[emphasis added].
3.2. The   Consideration 
Under English common law, a further bête noire – probably the most dangerous 
one – is represented by the fact that such a system traditionally treats consideration 
as a requisite both for the validity of contracts and for their enforceability as early 
as Curie v. Misa.16 Therefore consideration turns out to be a salient feature in con-
struing the matter at issue, irrespective of the legal characterisation (either a uni-
lateral promise or an actual contract) of the M&A Option.
It will sufﬁce for the purposes of this analysis to be reminded that the consideration, 
in the case of M&A Options, is the price for which the promise of the other contract-
ing party has been bought;17 thus only a promise given for value is enforceable.18 As 
a consequence of such a principle, for so long entrenched under common law,19 only 
a person who has provided consideration can sue20 and, secondly, consideration must 
be endowed with certain, speciﬁc characteristics; namely:
(a)  The same must not be illegal, based on Allen v. Rescous;21
15 See M Hogg, Obligations (2nd edn, Azivandum 2006) at 60.
16 [1875] LR 10 Ex.
17 In other words, the “Premium”.
18 See again Curie v. Misa (n 16). 
19 Eg I Brown and A Chandler, Law of Contract (5th edn, OUP 2005) at 29, 51; J Poole, Casebook 
on Contract Law (8th edn, OUP 2006) at 120, 178; GH Treitel, ‘Consideration’ in HG Beale (ed), Chitty 
on Contracts, General Principles, vol 1 (30th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) at 253, 377; E McKendrick, 
Contract Law. Text, Cases, and Materials (n 12) at 150, 151.
20 See Tweddle v. Atkinson [1861] 121 ER 762. 
21 [1676] Freem KB 433; 2 Levinz 174.PIERDOMENICO DE GIOIA-CARABELLESE 386
(b) Based on Chappell22, it must be of some value (normally of an economic 
character) but this need not be necessarily adequate; 
(c)  Lastly, consideration is required for simple contracts, but is not necessary 
for contracts by deed.23
Admittedly, under the same English law of contract, the doctrine of consideration 
seems to be a stronghold “under siege”. Apart from considering that such a concept 
is unknown both under the Civilian Systems and under the emerging principles of 
European law, even some common law scholars are inclined to consider such doc-
trine somewhat artificial.24 Despite this, the majority of English commentators are 
still adamant that the validity of the concept remains beyond any doubt, although 
the explanations provided to such an end seem to impinge on mere tautologies.25  
These optimistic (or too simplistic?) stances are echoed by those26 who emphasise 
that a reworking of the theory would not be necessary either, for the reason that, 
on the one hand, 
“There are few cases where even in modern times courts have decided that con-
tractual claims must fail for want of consideration,”
and, on the other hand,
“On careful examination it will usually be found that such claims could have 
been decided on other grounds, e.g. the absence of an intention to create legal 
relations or the fact that the transaction was induced by duress.” 
22 Chappell & Co Ltd v. Nestle Co Ltd [1959] 2 All ER 701 but, more recently, Midland Bank Trust 
Co. Ltd v. Green (no 1) [1981] AC 513. Among commentators, see, among the others, P Richards, Law 
of Contract (7th edn, Pearson Longman 2006) 60; E McKendrick, Palgrave Macmillan Law Masters. 
Contract Law (7th edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2007) at 89 and more recently E McKendrick, Palgrave 
Macmillan Law Masters. Contract Law (8th edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2009) at 68, 72.
23 L Koffman & E Macdonald, The Law of Contract (6th edn, OUP 2006) at 56.
24 In such sceptical terms PS Atiyah, ‘Consideration: A Restatement’ in PS Atiyah (ed), Essays on 
Contract (Clarendon Press 1986) at 179, 243.
The most signiﬁcant of Atiyah’s statements is worth being recalled:
“The truth is that the courts have never set out to create a doctrine of consideration. They have 
been concerned with the much more practical problem of deciding in the course of litigation whether 
a particular promise in a particular case should be enforced.[…] It seems highly probable that when 
the courts ﬁrst used the word “consideration” they meant no more than there was good “reason” for the 
enforcement of the promise. If the consideration was “good”, this meant that the court found sufﬁcient 
reason for enforcing the promise.”
25 E McKendrick, Contract Law. Text, Cases, and Materials (n 12) at 278, who is of the opinion that: 
“[…], [I]t is unlikely that the courts will […] abandon the doctrine.”
26 Among the others, Lord Stein, ‘Contract Law: Fulﬁlling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest 
Men’ (1997) 113 LQR 433, 437.SCOTTISH (AND ITALIAN) UNILATERAL PROMISE [2011] EBLR 387
As hinted at above, the “last rites” of the consideration appear to have already been 
read at supranational level, namely according to Art. 2.101 of the Principles of 
European Contract law;27 similarly the Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts adopt the same approach, as per Art. 3.2.28 
3.3. Engl  ish Law and M&A Options
Given the legal scenario described above and by turning the focus to the posits 
under this article, an M&A Option, under English law, would be valid only to the 
extent to which the beneficiary gave value for it and therefore, if at the same time 
as the formation of the M&A Option a Premium were awarded to the promisor. By 
contrast, any dearth of Premium could lead one to conclude that the M&A Option 
was actually gratuitous; as a result, the promise would fail to incorporate an actual 
legal intention to create a binding obligation and, in the time elapsing between the 
conclusion of the M&A Option and the exercise of the right, the promisor could 
even withdraw the promise.29 
Such stances, on the other hand, could be inferred both in the case the M&A Option 
were structured as a promise and should the same be envisaged as an actual bilateral 
agreement. In both circumstances, in actual fact, the consideration would be the nec-
essary feature and, in the absence of this, the M&A Option would not purport to cre-
ate a stable tie between the contracting parties. 
As a rule of thumb, M&A Options may not be characterised as unilateral contracts, 
at least as long as they are conﬁgured as contracts entered into between two parties, 
whose object is to confer a right to do something (either to purchase or to sell). On 
the other hand, room for a possible characterisation of the M&A Option as a unilateral 
contract could stem from the Option itself being envisaged by one party as a grant 
unilaterally conceded to the beneﬁciary. Remarkably, should the latter be the case, 
the unilateral structure of the Option would raise two intriguing questions; namely, 
whether that promise is nonetheless made, and therefore the same is enforceable, even 
without a formal acceptance; secondly, whether such acceptance must be notiﬁed.
27 Art. 2.101 (“Conditions for the Conclusion of a Contract”)
“A contract is concluded if:
(a)the parties intend to be legally bound; and
(b) they reach a sufﬁcient agreement
without any further requirement.”
“A contract need not be concluded or evidenced in writing nor is it subject to any other requirement 
as to form. The contract may be proved by any means, including witness.”
28 The tenor of Art. 3.2 is eloquent in this respect: 
“A contract is concluded, modiﬁed or terminated by the mere agreement of the parties, without any 
further requirement”
See, in this respect, O Radley-Gardner and H Beale, European Private Law (Hart Publishing 2003) 
at part 3.
29 In other words, the Premium is the keystone for the Option legal architecture to “work” under 
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As for the ﬁrst issue, it is recognised nowadays that the performance of the task 
required does indeed amount to acceptance. The principle, in fact, is set out in the 
Harvela case; in essence, as per Lord Diplock’s averments, the invitation issued ought 
to be treated as a “unilateral” or “if” contract. More precisely:
“Such unilateral contracts were made at the time when the invitation was received 
by the promisee to whom it was addressed by the vendors.” 
As far as the second issue is concerned, it is trite law that, in dealing with unilateral 
contract, there is no actual need to notify the acceptance. Such a principle has been 
entrenched under case law since Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball30 and is echoed in 
Balfour v. Balfour31.
4. Scot  s Law and M&A Options: the Unilateral Promise 
4.1. Definition
Scots law, in contrast to English law, expressly recognises unilateral promises as 
a tangible and palpable sign of its tribute to the Roman law roots. The unilateral 
promise is commonly defined as 
“An undertaking, binding on one party alone, to do or refrain from doing speciﬁc 
acts.”32 
In essence, the contract is bilateral, whereas the promise is unilateral, as only one 
party is bound by the obligation.33
In addition to this, the promise is fundamentally treated as an agreement, in cases 
where it was concluded between two parties and, therefore, it was embodied in a 
contractual framework. Under case law such a reasoning is advocated as per 
L P Hope’s averments in Lord Advocate v. City of Glasgow District Council34:
“If the obligation is based on a promise, that expression of willingness may be 
by one party only. If it is based on offer and acceptance the expression of willing-
ness must be by both. [..] On either alternative the party who has expressed his 
30 [1893] 1 QB 256.
31 [1919] 2 KB 57.
32 At level of mere manuals, the deﬁnition is provided by M Hogg (n 15) at 44.
33 In a more recent comment (G Gordon, ‘The Law of Contract’ in G Black (ed), Business Law in 
Scotland (Thomson/W Green 2008) at 113), the phenomenon is synthesised as follows: 
“A promise places an obligation on one person alone. By contrast, contracts place obligations 
on both parties to the contract. In theory this is true even of gratuitous contracts.” [emphasis not per 
original text].
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willingness to be bound by the obligation can be said to have bound himself to it 
by his agreement.”
Moreover, the concept is echoed by scholars35 who, not without acumen, point out 
that in spite of a contract making reference to promises stemming from a party, 
such a contract shall not be re-characterised as a promise. That is to say, the bilat-
eral structure of the promise, as a contract, tends to prevail on the tenor of promise 
being somehow inferable from the declaration of one of the parties.
Differently from the unilateral promises, the concept of option seems be an unclear 
category under Scots law. Quite tautologically, it is afﬁrmed that it “is not a term of 
art”36 and that the option may be seen either as a ﬁrm offer or as a unilateral promise. 
Under authorities, it is afﬁrmed that the option, if encompassed by a contractual 
structure, shall be characterised as a ﬁrm offer;37 in Hamilton,38 where the controversy 
related to a memorandum of agreement entered into between two parties,39 Lord 
Trayner’s eloquent averments were the following:
“Although represented, and in some respects accurately represented, as an 
agreement between the parties, comes, in effect, to nothing that this – an offer on 
the part of the pursuer to sell the house to the defender, binding on the pursuer 
for a certain time, within which the defender had the option to accept or decline 
the offer. But the exercise of the option, which was just the acceptance of the 
offer, to be effectual and binding on either party required to be in writing, or 
proved by the oath of the party who was said to have accepted.” 
More recently, in approaching again the concept of the options and particularly in 
dealing with their effects, the judicial stances under Carmarthen Developments Ltd 
v. Pennington40 failed again clarifying in Scotland the ontological category at stake; 
in the Lord Hodge’s averments, the main consequences of the signing of an option 
are clarified once again and ad abundantiam: (i) until the beneficiary of the option 
has not exercised his right, no obligation arises on his part; (ii) once the right has 
been exercised, “he becomes bound to complete the contract by purchasing the 
35 WW McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (2nd edn, W Green 2001) at 19, as well as Idem, 
The Law of Contract in Scotland (3rd edn, Thomson/W Green 2007) at 17,18.
36 M Hogg, Obligations (n 15) at 63. In reality, as explained below, in civilian systems the option 
usual enjoys the status of autonomous concept.  
37 These stances may ﬁnd conﬁrmation in the Italian civil code, namely in the tenor of Art. 1331 
(see below Chapter 5).
38 Hamilton v. Lochrane (1899) 1 F 478.
39 In a nutshell, Hamilton undertook to build a house with Mrs Lochrane having the option to pur-
chase the tenure for a certain period of time. 
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subjects”.41 However, it is also recognised that in Scots law there is not a lucid 
position in this matter.42  
Somehow connected with these judicial stances, is the usual doctrinal interpreta-
tion of the phenomenon of the ordinary option as 
“A promise by the grantor to enter a contract on certain terms if the promise so 
desires within a given period of time. For that period of time the grantor may not 
withdraw.”43 
In the light of this, the conclusive stage of the transaction shall be the formation 
of the actual contract of sale, triggered by the notice of the intention to exercise 
the option.44 
4.2. If and When a Promise is Relevant under Law
Not every statement shall be characterised as a promise; it is not a coincidence that 
court decisions are not particularly inclined to acknowledge its existence (and, 
therefore, to recognise its mandatory effects). Paradigmatic of such a trend are 
significant rulings; namely: Bathgate v. Rosie45 and Stone v. MacDonald.46 Any 
legal offer must amount to an expression of willingness to be bound on specific 
terms. What courts must take into account in the case of dispute, pursuant to an 
objective test, is what a reasonable man would have deduced from both the terms 
and the conduct entailed to the disputed relationship.47 
In any case, should the statement be a promise, court decisions are adamant in 
inferring the binding nature of the promise, a withdrawal being totally excluded.48 
41 Carmarthen Developments Ltd v. Pennington (ibid), at para. 15. 
42 At para 15 Lord Hodge in the case Carmarthen (ibid) acknowledges:
“There may be disagreement as to the correct legal characterisation of an option in Scots law, 
namely whether it is a unilateral promise by the grantor, a conditional contract of sale or sui generis.”
43 HL MacQueen, ‘Offers, Promises and Options’ (1985) SLT (News) 187.
44 Therefore also the Option, as deﬁned supra as transactions entered into in the “M&A” market.
45 1976 SLT (Sh.Ct.) 16. As recalled doctrinally (see WW McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scot-
land (2nd edn) (n 35) at 16)), a mother promised to pay for the repair of a shop window damaged by 
her son.
46 (1979) SLT 288. In the case at stake, a conditional option to purchase heritage was treated as a 
promise as distinct from an offer.
47 N Busby and others, Scots Law (2nd edn, Lexis Nexis UK 2003) at 80. 
48 Littlejohn v. Hadwen (1882) 20 SLR 5; Paterson (A&G) Ltd v. Highland Railway Co. 1927 SC 
32 (HL).
In the latter, Viscount Dunedin expressly adheres to this concept, by underlining that:
“If I offer my property to a certain person at a certain price, and go on to say: “This offer is to be 
open up to a certain date,” I cannot withdraw that offer before that date, if the person to whom I have 
made the offer chooses to accept it…..”
Under doctrine, the theory is propounded by Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland (12th edn, 
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4.3. The Consideration and Further Issues
Not only does Scots law differ from English law in expressly recognising unilateral 
promises, but it is also remarkably peculiar, given the fact it does not contemplate 
the consideration as a necessary feature for any contractual agreement to be valid, 
as early as Kintore v. Sinclair.49 In this respect, the same Commentators50 are ada-
mant that:
“A promise requires the act of one party only- a contract requires at least two 
parties.” 
Also doctrinally and with a language not devoid of imagination, it is affirmed51 
that:
“Scots law never needed to indulge in the dark arts of consideration.”
In effect, if the contract is bilateral, then it will be indifferently either gratuitous 
or onerous. More specifically, a bilateral gratuitous contract will be 
“An agreement where, although there are two parties bound to the obligation, 
only one comes under any onerous duty.”
Similarly, unilateral promises as a rule of thumb may not be affected by the req-
uisite of the consideration, as this is not a condition for a promise to be valid.52 
Doctrinally, a further debate, particularly intense and animated, albeit fundamen-
tally devoid of practical implications, is whether unilateral promises are ever gratu-
itous. In fact, originally Institutional Writers unanimously tended to consider the 
promise itself as “naturally” gratuitous, given that: 
2001) para 4.2, where emphasis is placed on the fact that, whereas an offer is revocable until accepted, 
a promise is binding and irrevocable from the moment it is made. 
49 1623 Mor. 9425.
50 WW McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (2nd edn) (n 35) at 15.
51 JAK Huntley and AD Dedouli, ‘Third Party Rights, Promises and the Classiﬁcation of Obliga-
tions’ (2004) Juridical Review 321.
52 In other words, every voluntary obligation is actionable, to the extent that it is supported by 
appropriate evidence. The concept is summed up by the Stair’s aphorism (Institutions, I.10.7) accord-
ing to which:
“Every paction produceth action, et omne verbum de ore ﬁdeli cadit in debitum.” (see JAK Huntley 
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“[A]t the moment the obligation is created, the promise comes under no obliga-
tion to the promisor, even although it may be envisaged by the parties that the 
promise is made with expectation of receiving something in return.”53
Similarly and more recently, Authors54 emphasise that: 
“The whole discussion of gratuitous obligations has been bedevilled by the con-
sideration of trivial examples such as the promise of a reward for walking to 
York”55
And, even more significantly, that:
“Promises are always gratuitous obligations. My unilateral statement cannot 
bind anyone else to do anything.” 
However, in contrast to this doctrinal strand,56 a school of thought is inclined to 
concede that a unilateral onerous promise can nonetheless exist in the Scottish 
jurisdiction, in addition to the gratuitous promise.57 
Whether or not the promise is valid even in onerous form, Scots law seems to 
hermeneutically broaden a lot (or too much?) the concept of the unilateral promises; 
not coincidentally and in stark contrast to continental jurisdictions,58 the range of what 
may be deemed a “promise” is a particularly wide one, as it comprises in a slightly 
confusing way both typically “contractual” concepts (options, a promise to keep an 
53 Erskine, Institutions 111.11.1. Such a view is echoed by the Stair’s classiﬁcation according to 
which an enforceable promise, being always unilateral, is also always gratuitous (Stair, Institutions 
I,10.12). 
54 See HL MacQueen, ‘Constitution and Proof of Gratuitous Obligations’ (1986) SLT (News) 1, 
at 3. See also, more recently, M Hogg, Obligations (n 15). For a wide and extensive description of 
the legal debate on the subject, see JAK Huntley and AD Dedouli, ‘Third Party Rights’ (n 51) at 318.
55 In the peculiarity of the example, the case Rogers v. Snow (1573) Dalison at 94 clearly transpires.
56 Incidentally, in Italy, unilateral promises shall be either gratuitous or onerous, according to their 
actual qualiﬁcation. For instance, a promessa al pubblico (promise to the public; see Art. 1989 of the 
Italian Civil Code), which would be a unilateral promise according to the Scottish legal concepts, shall 
be by deﬁnition gratuitous. Likewise, in this jurisdiction, a ﬁrm offer under Art. 1329, Italian Code, 
which in Scotland would be also a unilateral promise, would be either gratuitous or onerous. See amplius 
6.1 and 6.2 below, particularly n 75 as to the deﬁnition of a promessa al pubblico.
57 J Thomson, ‘Promises and the Requirements of Writing’ 1997 SLT (News) 284. Opposite to this 
view is that expressed by HL MacQueen, ‘Constitution and Proof of Gratuitous Obligations’ (n 54). 
The discrepancy emerging on the topic at stake between the two Authors is wittily acknowledged by 
them in a joint work (HL MacQueen and J Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (2nd edn, Tottel Pub-
lishing 2007) at 66, 67, particularly n 2 therein. For an overview on the matter in Italian, see L Vagni, 
La Promessa in Scozia. Per un  Percorso di Diritto Contrattuale Europeo (Giuffré 2008) at 226, par-
ticularly n 37 therein.
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offer open, the grant of an option) and typically non-contractual structures (the prom-
ise to pay a reward).59
Beyond the doctrinal dispute as to the feasibility of an onerous unilateral promise, 
Scots statute seems to establish a requisite of formal validity of the promise.60 In this 
respect reference must be made to the Requirement of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, 
namely Sections 1(1) and 1(2). More speciﬁcally, a unilateral promise, whose deﬁni-
tion is not provided within the context of the Act,61 needs to be in written form if it 
is gratuitous and the promisor releases it for reasons extraneous to his professional 
activity; conversely, through the combined reading of Sect. 2 and 3 of the above 
referred Act, “simple” contracts, whether or not onerous, are not subject to any writ-
ing encumbrance. 
4.4. Scots L  aw and M&A Options
The fact that under Scots law the grant of an option is viewed as a valid unilateral 
promise means that the M&A Option in that jurisdiction does not necessarily 
require the utilisation of a contractual structure for the purposes of its enforceabil-
ity. Likewise, the consideration as a concept not adopted by the Scots legal system, 
may lead one to affirm that the payment of the Premium will not be a necessary 
element for the M&A Option to be valid in this jurisdiction. In other words, Scots 
law is a system where the M&A Option, both in the usual onerous form and in the 
less frequent gratuitous one, would certainly be deemed as binding and enforceable.
59 WW McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (3rd edn) (n 35) at 20, 21. In spite of there being 
very few court decisions dealing with unilateral promises, it is usually inferred among scholars that 
unilateral promises are those falling within multifarious further typologies: (i) promise to pay an agent 
a commission; (ii) promise to hold an offer for a stated period; (iii) letter of credit by a banker; (iv) 
undertaking to accept the highest offer; (vi) undertaking to accept the lowest tender; (v) undertaking 
to pay for work done in reliance of a letter of intent; (vi) promise to take all future requirements from 
a particular supplier.
As far as the promise subject to a condition is concerned (or promise to a recompense), Scottish 
authorities have been for a long time inclined to apply to them the contractual pattern rather than the uni-
lateral one, probably mislead by the stances of the English authorities in Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball 
Co (n 30). This redundancy is indirectly underlined by L Vagni, (n 57) at 257. See also below Chapter 6. 
60 It is worth mentioning that, originally, under Scots common law promises could be constituted 
even verbally. In case of dispute, however, Courts usually required a special type of proof (proof “by 
writ or oath”), for the promise to be enforceable.
61 Quite controversially, the legislative framework at stake makes reference to the “gratuitous unilat-
eral obligation” rather than to the “promise”; however, the reading of the adjective unilateral as referring 
to the structure of the obligation, rather than the nature (onerous or gratuitous) of the promise, enables 
one to nonetheless conclude that the wording cannot help but referring to the “promise”. See L Vagni, 
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5. Promises an  d Options under Italian Law
5.1. Statuto  ry Provisions
Italian law, as a typical Civilian System, does recognise the option as an autono-
mous genre, with its own distinctive contractual nature. In fact it is prescribed under 
Art. 133162 (eloquently headed “Option”) of the Italian Civil Code63 that:
“When the parties agree that one of the same shall remain bound to his declara-
tion and the other is entitled to accept the same or not, the declaration of the 
former amounts to an irrevocable proposal at all events pursuant to Art. 1329.”
In turn, Art. 1329, Italian Code, states that, if the promisor binds herself to hold 
firm the contractual proposal for a certain time, the revocation is without effect.64 
Remarkably, in case of death or supervened incapability of the promisor, such a 
proposal – either if made under Art. 1329 or if formulated pursuant to Art. 1331, 
Italian Code – will be nonetheless efficacious, unless such an efficacy is excluded 
because of either the nature of the business or the practice. 
Not secondarily, Art. 1336, Italian Code, categorises the further concept of offer 
to the public (or public offer); this must be viewed as an ordinary offer (therefore 
endowed with contractual nature), although, differently from the latter, it is addressed 
to the public in general (in incertam personam). 
Incidentally, the offer to the public distances itself from the promessa al pubblico65 
(literally, promise to the public), for the reason that the former is merely a proposal 
to conclude a contract which must be accepted by the offeree, whereas the promessa 
al pubblico is fundamentally a promise of remuneration (or offer of reward) and is 
binding as soon as it is communicated by the promissor (rectius: disseminated).66 
It may be inferred from the above that the Italian legislative framework treats an 
option, with regard to its practical effects, fundamentally as an irrevocable proposal 
or, to put it in a Scottish law nomenclature, as a ﬁrm offer. As a result, M&A Options 
will be binding on the promising party, either in unilateral form or as a bilateral struc-
62 Eloquently, such article is headed “Option”. 
63 Henceforth also the “Italian Code”.
64 Cass civ, no 1917/1949. Among scholars, such a stance has been advocated as early as in 
M Betti, ‘Commentary to Court Decision’ (1949) Temi 567; A Torrente, ‘Commentary to Court Deci-
sion’ (1949) (I) Foro Italiano 1050. As to more recent doctrinal stances, see F Gazzoni, Manuale di 
Diritto Privato (13th edn, Edizioni Scientiﬁche Italiane 2007) at 848.
65 See below further explanations under Chapter 6.2.
66 G Branca, ‘Delle Promesse Unilaterali’ in A Scialoja and G Branca (eds), Commentario al Codice 
Civile Scialoja-Branca, sub art 1989, para IV (Zanichelli 1974) at 453; CM Bianca, Il Contratto, vol 2 
(Giuffré 2000) at 250. The promise to the public is usually viewed as a “unilateral act” (negozio uni-
laterale). Opposed to this and despite the clear tenor of the Italian Code, a minority strand of scholars 
tend to advocate the view according to which the promise to the public is a contract (see G Sbisà, La 
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ture, and the right of the promisee will not be affected by any unpredicted and/or 
unwanted withdrawal on the part of the promisor. Notwithstanding this, from a purely 
conceptual perspective, albeit without practical repercussions, both under authorities67 
and among commentators68, it is emphasised that an option under Art. 1329, Italian 
Code, might slightly differ from a ﬁrm offer because it is a bilateral negotium (or 
obligation). 
Finally, it is unnecessary here to go into the Principles of European Contract Law69 
beyond noting that they adopt an approach analogous to the Italian Code, given the 
fact that under such a supranational and conventional framework, a unilateral prom-
ise does constitute a distinct type of obligation.70
5.2. The “Co  nsideration”
From the Italian perspective (particularly according to Art. 1325, Italian Code), 
consideration is not a general requisite for a contract to be valid,71 nor is it required 
for irrevocable promises. Such a legal stance impacts significantly on the analysis 
of the M&A Options, the same fundamentally meaning that their validity is beyond 
discussion, independently of whether they are endowed with a Premium in favour 
of the promisor.
For the sake of completeness, it is worth noting that those which under Scots law 
are deﬁned as “unilateral promises”72 cannot be mistaken for the “promesse 
unilaterali”73 under the correspondent Italian legislative scenario, in spite of the 
apparently same terminology adopted. Remarkably, Italian Law, in addition to the 
contractual promises examined supra under 5.1, refers to unilateral promises as legal 
and binding non-contractual sources of obligations, albeit exclusively in nominated 
circumstances expressly contemplated under the same Italian Code. In other words, 
as a general principle, Italian law enables the parties to create contracts also not fall-
67 Cass civ, no 515/1955; Cass civ, no 1739/1967; Cass civ, no 3986/1974; Cass civ, no 3341/1977; 
Cass civ, no 3170/1978; Cass civ, no 579/1982; Cass civ, no 17737/2002.
68 Ex plurimis, see CM Bianca, Il Contratto, vol 2 (n 66) at 261,265. Opposed to this is the opinion 
of those who deem the option as fully ascribable to the irrevocable proposal (or ﬁrm offer) in resem-
blance to Art. 1329, Italian Code; see G Gabrielli, Il Rapporto Giuridico Preparatorio (Giuffré 1974) 
at 10.  
69 More speciﬁcally, C von Bar and others, Principles, Deﬁnitions and Model Rules of European 
Private Law (Selier 2008) at 105. 
70 According to Art. 1:103 of the “Principles” (“Binding effect”):
“A valid unilateral promise or undertaking is binding on the person giving it if it is intended to be 
legally binding without acceptance.”
71 Ex plurimis, R Sacco, ‘Il Contratto. 2’, in F Vassalli (ed), Trattato di Diritto Civile Italiano. Vol 
VI (UTET 1975) at 6 ff. 
72 See Chapter 5 above.
73 Promesse unilaterali is the literal translation of “unilateral promises”.PIERDOMENICO DE GIOIA-CARABELLESE 396
ing within a speciﬁc legal category;74 conversely, unilateral promises (promesse al 
pubblico), in order to be legally binding, must necessarily fall within one of the three 
nominated typologies mentioned under the Italian Code; namely, (i) the promise of 
payment and the recognition of debit;75 (ii) the promise to the public;76 (iii) the nego-
tiable instruments.77 The rationale behind this lies on the fact, from the perspective 
of the Italian legislator, parties are entitled to undertake obligations on unilateral basis 
exclusively through a contract of donation (whose rules are set forth under Artt. 769 
ff, Italian Code) or through the mechanism of the contract with obligations exclusively 
on the part of the offeror (Art. 1333, Italian Code).78 In this scenario, the consent is 
expected to work as a “stronghold”, because, on the one hand, it should defend the 
autonomy of the promisee, despite the favourable consequences of the promise (i.e. 
the “birth” of a new right); on the other hand, such consent aims to protect the prom-
isor too, because, thanks to it, the undertaking of the obligation, as required under 
Italian law for every obligation or negotium,79 will result in being “justiﬁed” in terms 
of cause. 
74 In detail, Articles 1321(1) and 1321(2) of the Italian Code:
“The parties are entitled to freely determine the content of the contract within the limits set forth 
by the law.”
“The parties are entitled also to conclude contracts which do not belong to kinds having a dedicated 
discipline to the extent to which the same are aimed to achieve interests worthy of protection pursuant 
to the public policy.” 
75 Art. 1988 of the Italian Code: 
“The promise of payment or the recognition of a debt holds harmless him in favour of whom the 
same is addressed, from the onus to prove it.”
76 Art. 1989 of the Italian Code:
“He who, in addressing to the public, promises a performance in favour of who is in a speciﬁc condi-
tion or carries out a deﬁnite action, is bound on the promise, as soon as the same has been published.” 
“If the promise is not endowed with an expiry, or the expiration is not inferable form the nature of 
form the scope of the promise itself, the promisor’s obligation terminates if, within one year as from 
the promise, he has not been informed of the fulﬁlment of the condition or the carry-out of the action 
contemplated under the promise.”
The gratuity of the promessa al pubblico is emphasised by Italian scholars. Ex plurimis: CM Bianca, 
Il Contratto, vol 2 (n 66) at 250:
“L’offerta al pubblico non dev’essere confusa con la promessa al pubblico, la quale è un negozio 
unilaterale, e precisamente l’assunzione di un’obbligazione gratuita nei confronti di chiunque del pub-
blico sia in una data situazione o compia una determinata azione.”  
77 In other words, bills of exchange and cheques.
78 Therefore, without acceptance. 
Namely, Art. 1333, Italian Code, states as follows:
“The offer aimed at concluding a contract from which obligations exclusively on the part of the 
offeror arise, is irrevocable as soon as the offer is known to the offeree.
The offeree may reject the offer within the time requested by the nature of the business or because 
of the practice. In lack of such a rejection the contract is deemed as concluded.”
79 Art. 1325 n. 2, Italian Code. See in this respect F Gazzoni (n 64) 693; G Branca, Promesse Uni-
laterali, vol 2, in F Galgano (ed), Commentario del Codice Civile Scialoja-Branca, Art. 1960–1991 
(Società Editrice del Foro Italiano – Zanichelli 1974) at 407; under authorities, see Pescara Tribunal, 
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It is intuitive, therefore, in light of the description provided, that “unilateral prom-
ises” which Scots law utilises to encompass a “melting pot” of obligations endowed 
with either contractual or non-contractual nature, correspond just partly to the unilat-
eral non-contractual promises under Artt. 1987 ff, Italian Code, to which the Italian 
legislative system refers. As a rule of thumb, the discrepancy is paradigmatic of the 
different way in which an identical concept (the unilateral promises under Roman 
law) has been implemented in two different jurisdictions.
6. Conclusions  
This work has brought to light significant differences in how three jurisdictions 
(English, Scots and Italian) regard the subject of unilateral promises (and unilateral 
contracts in England) and how, consequently, the M&A Options may be character-
ised and treated in terms of validity and enforceability in each of them. 
Nearly paradoxically, English law – at international level the jurisdiction usually 
chosen by parties to govern these typologies of contract -, in acquiescing into the legal 
concept of consideration, seems not to offer an adequate protection to the contracting 
parties to an M&A Option. Likewise, although such a jurisdiction has recognised, 
indeed very recently, the concept of the “unilateral contract” via case law, it is not 
yet so adamant in respect of the binding character of such a concept. 
Scots law, quite surprisingly, reveals a certain degree of ﬂexibility, as it does not 
pay tribute to the theory of consideration, and moreover, in the wake of its remarkable 
Roman roots, does recognise unilateral promises. As a result, the promise does not 
require speciﬁc consideration, nor can it be withdrawn by the offeror, therefore in a 
legal scenario it certainly caters for certainty and stability within the ambit of the 
contractual relationships (particularly for those at stake, the M&A Options). 
In the “Continent”, Italian law would treat M&A Options pursuant to legal prin-
ciples theoretically not so dissimilar from those existing in Scotland, an obvious dif-
ference being that under Italian law, as a Roman legal system which beneﬁted (or 
suffered?) from the Napoleonic codiﬁcation process, rules relating to the unilateral 
promise, as well as those concerning the contractual proposal, the option, the ﬁrm 
offer and the promise to the public, are duly enshrined under its legal written frame-
work governing the matter of both the contracts and the quasi-contracts. 
However, and probably also as a result of such a codiﬁcation, the concept of uni-
lateral promises (indeed dispersed in Scotland into a too vast conceptual perimeter 
and probably impinging also in a conceptual “blunder” where, on the one hand, it 
completely omits the concept of both the non-contractual, albeit binding, “promise 
to the public”80, on the other hand it forgets to give autonomy to the concept of 
“option”) tends to have, in a more lucid way, at least three solid correspondent ram-
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iﬁcations in Italy: (i) option/ﬁrm offer; (ii) offer to the public; (iii) promise to the 
public and lato sensu the unilateral promises.81
Despite the basic proximity of the principles of the law of contract existing within 
the two jurisdictions (Italy and Scotland), the Scots jurisprudence seems to have been 
inﬂuenced in a negative way by the principles of common law, blossomed in the 
adjacent English jurisdiction; this is due to both concepts that are clearly contradic-
tory (the epitome might be the “unilateral contract”) and authorities that might create 
asymmetries and inconsistencies with the Roman general theory of both the promise 
and the option (the thought in this case instinctively goes towards Carlill82). 
Finally, in non-legal terms and in looking at the speciﬁc transactions of the M&A 
Options, a doubt assaults the interpreter: if Scots law, despite certain arguable stances 
embodied in its corpus,83 might represent a safe harbour for the “Ulysses” who have 
to navigate through the perilous waters of M&A transactions (as opposed to the mis-
chievous Sirens who still populate the routes of the “English waters”), why do inter-
national banks (even the Scottish ones) tend to subject the M&A Options to English 
jurisdiction? The non-English language in which the provisions of law are conceived 
and written down, could be a justiﬁcation for the Italian jurisdiction; however, this 
answer cannot work in dealing with a legal system, such as the Scottish, based on a 
perfectly “Shakespearean” language! 
Also in the light of these observations, de iure condendo the empirical evidence 
provided in this article might suggest Scotland adopt soon a code of the contract, in 
a position, on the one hand, to categorise more rationally its concepts (such as the 
“unfettered” unilateral promise) of Roman tradition and, on the other hand, to be able 
to offer more convincingly its jurisprudence as a “governing law” at international 
level. 
81 As already mentioned, the promise to the public, the promise of payment (and recognition of 
debit) and the negotiable instruments. 
82 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball (n 30).  
83 These stances are even more evident in comparing its discipline to the Italian one. See, in this 
respect and in a persuasive way, L Vagni, La Promessa in Scozia (n 57) at 268. The Author rigorously 
notes that the Scottish “model” does not allow a clear differentiation between promise and contract. The 
autonomy of the promise in comparison to the contract is affected by an analysis of the former from a 
“contractual” perspective. It is not a case Scottish jurists deal with the subject of the promise, simply 
afﬁrming that “promise” and “offer” differ from each other because the former, unlike the latter, does 
not require the acceptance for the purposes of the “birth” of the obligation. 